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1. Introduction
Subsequent to the collapse of the communist regime in 1989, Romania has undergone
political and economic changes which have determined radical changes in industrial
relations (IR). Nevertheless, ten years after the fall of the communist regime, the old
and new elements still exist side by side, although labour legislation and an institu-
tional framework similar to those in developed countries has been adopted.2
It appears that communist legacies, such as the specific economic and political
context which exists in Romania, the lack of experience of all the actors involved in
IR and also the current international context have all had an important impact on the
emerging IR system in Romania. Nevertheless, there has been very little empirical re-
search into how the IR system works in practice and how terms and conditions of em-
ployment are established and implemented at company level.3
The aim of this paper is, firstly, to present a new perspective on Crouch’s exchange
theory of IR (1993) and, secondly, to use this approach to analyse empirical findings
regarding the changes which have occurred in IR at the company level in Romania
since 1989. The empirical findings will be presented for each of the six categories in-
vestigated,4 analysing the development of IR since 1989. After that, a synthesis of the
findings will be presented in an attempt to answer the research questions indicated in
the next section.
2. Research questions
This study aims to answer the following questions:
a) at which stage of development is industrial relations in different types of com-
pany?
b) how do changes in the IR system at company level take place?
c) what influence does the company context (ownership, size and type of product:
manufacturing or services) have upon the emerging IR system in the companies
investigated?
1 I am extremely grateful to my supervisor, Prof. Karl Koch, for having encouraged and
supported me to carry out this research. In addition, I wish to thank all the respondents
who provided valuable information without which I could not write this article. Also, I
wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of participants in the Crete Seminar (2000),
particularly to Roland Erne. Nevertheless, the views expressed are my own.
2 See OECD (2000), p. 3.
3 Most of the studies focus on labour legislation, trade unions and miners’ strikes (e.g.
Croucher (1998); Moarcas (1999); Popescu (1999); and Stefanescu (1997)).
4 See Table 1, page 3.
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d) how do employees and their representatives, and employers and their representa-
tives, perceive the outcome of the transformation of IR in the companies investi-
gated?
3. Methodology
3.1 Theoretical remarks
Dunlop’s systems theory (1958) is used to identify the macroeconomic inputs which
have an important impact on an IR system (e.g. the political, economic and legal con-
texts), as well as on its structure, which consists of the actors (workers and their or-
ganisations, employers and their organisations, and government) and the interactions
between them at the different levels.
The environmental inputs at the macro level, such as the political, economic, legal,
social and historical contexts, have been similar for most of the companies investi-
gated,5 but the company environment varies from one to another, depending mainly
on the owner (which may be considered as the “political context” at the micro level),
size (“technical context”) and type of product – manufacturing or services – (the “eco-
nomic context”). Considering these three factors identified by Dunlop (1958), the
companies have been classified in six categories presented in Table 1.
As regards ownership, the companies investigated were classified into two types:
(a) state-owned companies (categories 1 and 2 in Table 1); and
(b) privately-owned companies (categories 3-6).
The private ones were sub-divided into four categories: new national companies
set up since 1989 (category 3); national privately-owned companies which belonged
to the state before 1989 and which are now Romanian-owned private companies (cat-
egory 4); foreign-owned companies based in Romania (category 5); and multinational
foreign-owned companies (category 6).
Regarding size, the companies investigated were also classified into three catego-
ries, along the lines of their classification in official records in Romania:
(a) large companies, which have more than 200 employees;
(b) medium companies, which have between 50 and 200 employees; and
(c) small companies, which have up to 50 employees.
As regards the type of product, the companies investigated were classified in two
separate categories:
(a) the manufacturing sector, which included all those companies which primarily
make products; and
(b) the service sector, which includes companies which mainly provide services.
A range of different companies were investigated,6 because the aim of the study is
to obtain an overview of the changes which have occurred in IR at the company level
5 Apart from the Hungarian company.
6 See Table 1 for details.
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since 1989. Therefore, a series of factors mentioned by Dunlop as being important are
have been neglected, such as the characteristics of the labour force and the competi-
tive position of the company or the sector of industry in which it operates. These are
considered less important for the purpose of this experiment.
3.2 Research methodology
The primary data was collected using semi-structured interviews, largely in Roma-
nian companies (15 organisations) but also in one Hungarian company. An interview
lasted around one hour, in the first half of which the respondent discussed the main
changes in IR in general and within their company (organisation) while, in the sec-
ond, the researcher asked specific questions.
The interview comprised questions concerning the main actors identified by Dun-
lop (1958) and the relations between them: the mechanisms for establishing terms and
conditions of employment, such as collective and individual bargaining; the imple-
mentation of rules agreed at different levels; and conflict between employers and em-
ployees. In addition, it included a question concerning the main issues in IR and one
which inquired on ways of improving IR.
The sample covered all the main actors involved: employees and their representa-
tives; managers and employers; trade union and employers association officials; and
specialised labour agencies. It also attempted to cover all main types of organisation,
comprising 16 organisations and five institutions, as follows:
Table 1 – Classification of companies included in the survey
Code Categories of companies Manufacturing, 
product
Services Total
1. S-L Large state-owned compa-
nies
 1-steel 1-railway 2
2. S-SME Small and medium state-
owned companies
- 2-R&D (geophys-
ics, sports); 1-edu-
cation
3
3. P(S)-L Large privatised companies 
– pre-1989 state-owned 
3-furniture, textiles, 
glass
1-consultancy (en-
ergy)
4
4. P-SME New private national SME 1-printing 2-consultancy
(IT, survey)
3
5. Pf-SME Foreign-owned SME 1-brewery 1-distribution dye 2
6. Pf-MNC MNC (foreign-owned) 1-electrical meters 1-IT 2
Total 5 – state owned, 11 – pri-
vate
7 9 16
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Legend
R&D  – research and development; consultancy
HRM – human resource manager
MM – middle manager
TM – top manager
ESC  – the Economic and Social Council
ILO – International Labour Organisation
1 – MNC from Hungary
* – 1 employers association official is an employer as well
Nevertheless, the sample had a series of limitations: there is only a small number
of interviews in each category; in some organisations only employees and/or their rep-
resentatives were interviewed, in others only the employer and/or the management,
while in yet others, both groups were interviewed. Another shortcoming is that the
sample does not cover all the regions of the country; companies investigated came
only from two areas: Bucharest (south-east – 12 organisations); and Bistriţa (north-
west region – 4 companies).
However, most categories of companies and specific institutions are covered,
while many respondents talked about what was happening in other categories of firms
and about IR at the national level. Moreover, many times they discussed macro issues
which were not directly related to IR, such as corruption, economic recession or fi-
nancial blockages.
Employees or their 
representatives (e)
e-Ro Employers or managers 
(E)
E- 
Ro
Total
1 S-L 1 employee, 1 shop steward 2 1 HRM, 1 MM 2 4
2 S-SME 2 employees 2 1 HRM, 2 TM, 2 MM 5 7
3 P(S)-L 2 employees, 3 shop stewards 5 1TM, 1 MM 2 7
4 P-SME 1 ex-employed (unemployed) 1 3 Employers 3 4
5 Pf-SME 1 employee 1 1 MM 1 2
6 Pf-MNC 1 employee1 1 HRM, 1 HRM1, 1 TM1, 
1 MM1
1 5
Total 12 – 7 employees, 4 shop stew-
ards and 1 unemployed
11 17 – 3 employers, 4 HRM,
4 TM, 6 MM
14 29
Institutions No. interviews
1 Trade union official – national level 2
2 Employers association official – national level 2*
3 The Ministry of Labour – the Legislative Council 1
4 Social Dialogue – ESC 1
5 ILO-Romania 1
Total 7(6)
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4. Conceptual framework – Crouch’s exchange theory (1993) revised
Crouch’s exchange approach (1993) provides a theoretical framework for analysing
the dynamic behaviour of IR, having as a focal point changes in the power relation-
ship between labour and capital which are involved in a rational exchange, or choice.
Taking into account the exchange relationship between labour and capital, Crouch
distinguishes four types of IR systems as follows:
(a) contestation refers to an unformed relationship between labour and capital, where
a change to the benefit of one party can be achieved only through the disadvantage
of the other and the result of the exchange between them is a zero-sum game
(b) pluralist bargaining refers to an established relationship between labour and capi-
tal (e.g. institutionalised collective bargaining) where the exchange relationship
between labour and capital leads to the development of a minor substantive posi-
tive-sum
(c) bargained corporatism refers to a tripartite relationship involving organised la-
bour, organised capital and the state (specialised governmental agencies), which
establishes the main rules of employment relationships at the national level, seek-
ing to spread the positive-sum game throughout the entire country on the basis of
centralised collective bargaining
(d) authoritarian corporatism refers to the end-point of the bargained corporatist
stage as theoretically being the reduction of all transactions between labour and
capital to a positive-sum game, which implies an identity between capital and la-
bour.
In order to explore IR in Romania, Crouch’s approach has been revised. First, as
can be seen in Figure 1, it is considered that a negative-sum game of the exchange be-
tween labour and capital ((l+(c<0, where (l<0, (c<0) may be registered.7 This goes, in
a way, against the rational choice theory on which the sum game approach is based
but, in practice, there are not only positive- and zero-sum games in an exchange rela-
tionship; it may be possible for both parties to lose. Sometimes, a third party can ma-
nipulate them to create advantages for itself (this being their rational choice) and,
sometimes, people do not behave rationally and they prefer to lose rather than let the
other party win.
7 Crouch (1993: 32) acknowledges that the sum game of the exchange between labour and
capital can also be negative (e.g. a strike in which both labour and capital have a net loss),
but he does not consider this case another type of IR, incorporating it in the contestation
type.
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Figure 1 – Capital-labour exchange outcomes
Legend: (c, (l = shares of capital and labour as defined by Crouch (1993: 32)
Cases (I) and (II) are viable in the long term, because they permit capital accumu-
lation, while cases (III) and (IV), when the outcome of the exchange is negative for
capital, may be viable only in the short-term, where the capacity of capital is limited
(i.e. the company goes bankrupt). Nevertheless, if the company is subsidised by an ex-
ternal source (e.g. the state), a negative outcome for capital may be maintained over a
longer period, for as long as it receives a subsidy equal to or higher than its losses
from the external source.
The phenomena that has occurred since 1989 in public-owned companies in many
CEECs may be considered as part of the rational choice of a third party – top manag-
ers – who, in the particular context of transition, have the potential to manipulate both
labour and capital (as represented by the state) into losing positions. They have a ra-
tional interest in making the company non-profitable so that they can buy its assets
cheaply, or they just use the company to serve their own personal interests.
Industrial corruption related to the privatisation process appears to be a phenome-
non widespread in many CEECs.8 According to Popescu-Birlan (1994), those holding
key positions in state-owned companies in Romania have started their own businesses
using company assets, transferring funds and goods to their own firm or acting as a
distributor of the products of the state-owned company. The legislation does not allow
this, but they have registered relatives as owners of the company and, in many cases,
managers have bribed state department directors:
In December 1993, the newspaper Adevărul reported that there had been 1200 cases of ‘seri-
ous illegal acts’ by managers of [Romanian] state-owned enterprises. (Croucher, 1998: 34)
This phenomenon is likely to persist in publicly-owned companies as long as
property rights are not clearly defined, there is a lack of legislation and/or insufficient
institutional capacity to enforce it and top managers have autonomy whilst not being
firmly accountable to anyone.
CAPITAL INTEREST
Outcome of the 
exchange Positive Negative
LABOUR 
INTEREST
Positive
I
Positive-sum game
∆+∆c>0, where ∆l>0, ∆c>0
III
Zero-sum game
pro-labour
∆l+∆c=0, where ∆l≥0, ∆c≤0
Negative
II
Zero-sum game
pro-capital
∆l+∆c=0, where ∆l≤0, ∆l≥0
IV
Negative-sum game
∆l+∆c<0, where ∆l<0, ∆c<0
8 See Croucher (1998).
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The new type of IR in which the sum game of the exchange between capital and
labour is negative is named “Stage 0”. In the particular case of the transition from
communism to the market economy, it includes a series of features met during the
communist period but which now occur in the context of the pluralist framework. This
results in an undefined relationship between capital and labour: sometimes the power
of capital is lower than, or equal to, that of labour, at others capital has more power;
the extent of government intervention is high; and there is still a big difference be-
tween the ‘formal’ and the ‘practical’ roles played by the actors (e.g. that played by
the top managers).
The second adjustment of Crouch’s theory refers to the division of each type of IR
identified in four phases: transition; development; maturity; and decline. Important
differences between these phases were noticed in the companies investigated, even
though the power relationship between labour and capital may not have changed dra-
matically.
The transition phase is considered to be the period in which fundamental change
takes place and where the basis for that particular stage is determined. The develop-
ment phase is the period after the transition when there are still major changes occur-
ring, but in the direction established in the transition period. Following this, the matu-
rity phase is characterised by more stability when the IR system has settled down. The
decline phase is considered to occur when the power of the stronger actor (capital or
labour) decreases and the power of the weaker one increases. However, these descrip-
tions do not clearly define each phase; hence, the inclusion of an IR system from one
company in a particular phase may be influenced by the subjective perceptions of the
researcher.
The third adjustment of Crouch’s theory concerns the category of positive-sum
games. Crouch included in his authoritarian corporatism all types of IR which seek
to have a positive-sum game, although he recognised that these are very different in
other respects (1993: 48). In this study, authoritarian corporatism, human resource
management (HRM) and the marxist approach are considered as distinct types of IR
due to the differences in many other parameters apart from the sum game of the ex-
change between labour and capital, which is ‘theoretically’ similar.9 Taking into ac-
count that there is a pluralist legislation in Romania, the only possible type of IR at
the company level in this category is HRM.
This revised exchange theory of Crouch is used to identify the type of IR in the
Romanian companies investigated, as outlined in Figure 2. The main parameters taken
into consideration are: the level of power of capital vis-à-vis that of labour; and the
sum game of the exchange between capital and labour as they were subjectively per-
ceived and outlined by the respondents. In addition, other parameters mentioned by
Crouch are also taken into consideration, such as the mechanism of exchange between
labour and capital, the type of relations between labour and capital (adversarial or co-
9 For instance, the abstract principles of authoritarian corporatism, the ideology adopted by
the fascists, are totally opposed to those of the marxist, the ideology adopted by the com-
munists, although both claim to have a positive outcome for all.
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operative) and the level where the exchange takes place. Nevertheless, the categoris-
ing of the type of IR is likely to be influenced by the subjective perceptions of the re-
searcher.
5. Data analysis and discussion
5.1. Large state-owned companies – S-L
The law on State Enterprise Reorganisation (Law No. 15/1990) divided state-owned
companies into two groups with different legal status:
(a) the first group consist of ‘autonomous regies’, which include companies from the
‘strategic domains’ of the economy, such as the armaments industry, water supply,
energy supply and the railways, which are intended to remain under state owner-
ship; and
(b) the second group, ‘commercial companies’, which include all other state-owned
companies eligible for privatisation.
The S-L category in the sample includes one “commercial company” in manufac-
turing (S-Lm), and one in services (S-Ls), which belongs to the “autonomous regies”
group. Both companies have been restructured; the commercial company retained
16% of the labour force; while the other kept 48%. It appears that both companies did
not have a clear human resource strategy nor objective criteria to select the personnel
who were to be made redundant, although some improvements have been made since
1996. A trade union operates within each company; the one in S-Lm has around 70%
membership, while that in S-Ls around 90%, according to the respondents, but they
are considered to be weak because they do not have the support of their members.
It appears that, even though the formal mechanisms specific to a market economy
have been introduced, such as collective and/or individual bargaining, they do not op-
erate properly in practice within the large state-owned companies, either in manufac-
turing or in the service sector. According to the respondents, in reality there is fre-
quently no bargaining because the management has much more power than labour:
they say ‘there are n other people waiting to take your job if you do not like these
terms and conditions of employment’. Top management impose most of the decisions
without a strategy to make the companies more efficient, in many cases seeking just to
achieve personal gain. On the other hand, many employees are used to receiving ‘or-
ders’ from their superiors, are able to take no initiative and are accustomed to working
as little as possible. However, middle management appears to be the ‘driving force’
towards real change, and they have experienced positive change, but they do not seem
to have been delegated enough power to act.
It also appears that, even though institutionalised collective bargaining has been
introduced, the state still has a high degree of intervention in IR. In addition, the inter-
action between capital and labour at the top level remains important, the sum game of
the exchange between them is largely negative and the market orientation is not
clearly defined, so the S-L companies investigated appeared to be in Stage 0. Never-
theless, S-Lm seems to be in a transition phase because the state of the company is not
yet clear (it ought to be privatised). Consequently, the basis of the IR set-up could not
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be established, while S-Ls appears to be in a development phase where a mechanism
of collective bargaining was set up, but there are still large differences between the le-
gal situation and the actual roles being played by the actors, particularly by the state in
its double role as employer and government.
5.2 Small and medium-sized state-owned organisations (S-SME)
This sample comprises three types of organisations, all from the service sector, but in
different markets:
(a) one belongs to the public administration sector (education) – S-SMEs1;
(b) one to the ‘autonomous regies’ group – S-SMEs2; and
(c) one is included in the ‘commercial companies’ group – S-SMEs3.
The main difference between them in terms of IR is that, in S-SMEs1, the govern-
ment determines the wage levels after consulting with trade unions at the national
level; in S-SMEs2, government establishes the lower and upper limits of salaries, but
there can still be bargaining between these limits; and in S-SMEs3, there is total flexi-
bility to establish salaries. Nevertheless, none of these organisations have reduced
their personnel, the level being largely similar to that of 1989.
The S-SMEs1 organisation, which belongs to public administration, is the only
one which has almost complete trade union membership, including amongst manage-
ment, but it is not really active because the salary is established at national level, leav-
ing very little room for manoeuvre at the local level. Within the other organisations, it
seems that they have been unable to organise a union because of the divergent inter-
ests of the workers.
Therefore, it appears that the IR system in S-SMEs1 is in a development phase of
institutionalised collective bargaining, where the basis for a new model has been set
up, and there is more delegation of power to, and more flexibility at, the local level,
but, according to the respondents, the system is still rigid and not working properly.
Salaries and other terms and conditions of employment are established through nego-
tiations between trade unions and the government at the sectoral level, leaving few op-
tions open to the local unions.
The IR system within S-SMEs2 seems to be in the maturity phase of Stage 0, be-
cause it has not really changed since 1989. The mechanism for collective and individ-
ual bargaining has been set up and there is a collective contract signed at the company
level, but the top management, more or less, impose the terms and conditions of em-
ployment. According to the respondents, the legacy of the communist period is quite
strong in this company, while the gap between the ‘formal’ situation and ‘reality’ is
still large and efficiency takes second place after the social dimension.
IR within S-SMEs3 appears to be in a development stage of HRM, because there
is a clear market orientation policy, the interaction between capital and labour takes
place at the local level and representation is mainly individual. A collective agreement
exists at the local level, but it only sets the procedural rules. The intervention of the
state is very low, the market being the main factor which influences the salary of em-
ployees. The system is considered in a development phase because the mechanism
was set up in 1999, the relations between managers and employees, and between em-
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ployees, are largely conjunctive and often adversarial, and it seems that more experi-
ence is needed to deal with the new system in order that it may mature.
Therefore, the experiences in small and medium-sized organisations in the state
sector vary greatly from Stage 0 to HRM. All of them have more decentralised struc-
tures and more flexibility than before 1989, but each are confronted with problems of
the lack of experience of managers and employees, individualisation and the lack of a
sense of real collaboration.
5.3 Large privatised companies – state-owned pre-1989 – P(S)-L
This sample comprises of four organisations which are ‘commercial companies’,
three of them from different industries in the manufacturing sector (textiles, furniture
and glass industry) and one from the service sector. All of them had been restructured
with massive reductions of personnel in 3-4 rounds (between 30% and 75% of the to-
tal number of employees was made redundant), but each one still has at least 1000
employees. There is at least one local trade union in each of them and the membership
is over 60%, according to the respondents. The trade unions were not involved in the
privatisation process. Those from the manufacturing sector were not informed or con-
sulted about privatisation; in the service sector they were consulted but they retained a
passive attitude in the sense that, while they were not against the privatisation proc-
ess, neither did they support it. Collective bargaining at the company level is the main
mechanism for establishing terms and conditions of employment in all four of the
companies. Individual ‘bargaining’ exists, but it is largely a formality; the majority of
the employees just sign their contracts.
The general opinion of the respondents was that the three organisations had expe-
rienced changes in IR since 1989 that were to a certain extent positive, but one com-
pany in the manufacturing sector reported that employment relations had worsened
since 1989. The main positive aspects were that top managers are more open to com-
munication with employees, they are no longer ‘dictators’, there has been decentrali-
sation of the decision-making process and more power and authority has been dele-
gated to middle managers, and there is more flexibility and more individual
responsibility.
Nevertheless, many respondents mentioned a series of negative aspects, such as
job insecurity, social atomisation, no objective criteria for restructuring or dismissal
and that managers and employees were not prepared for a market economy system. It
appears that management experienced the more positive changes while ordinary em-
ployees experienced the more negative aspects of the restructuring process.
It appears that all P(S)–L companies developed their IR in stages, but the duration
of the stages was not the same for each and, by 2000, they have not reached the same
phase of development. Respondents identified a different number of stages or phases,
but they largely described similar experiences:
(a) there was a stage in which labour had more power than capital, followed by
(b) a stage when capital regained power and become more stronger than labour.
The P(S)-Lm1 company was privatised in 1990 and experienced just a short
‘chaos’ stage. This was because management took advantage of the lack of legislation
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and set up an order-based relationship. However, the relationship between the power
of labour and that of capital followed the same trend as in the other companies: the
power of the trade union was higher until 1994, before decreasing later and becoming
lower than that of capital by 2000. The company seems to be in the second stage de-
scribed above, but still in a phase of development.
Companies P(S)-Lm2 and P(S)-Ls1 experienced a longer period of ‘chaos’, start-
ing in 1990 and continuing until their privatisation in 1996 and 1997. Presently, they
also seem to be in the second stage described above, in a phase of development simi-
lar to P(S)-Lm1. The state of IR in P(S)-Lm3 looks very different to that of other three
companies, having no positive developments. This, too, is at the second stage, al-
though it remains in the first phase of adversarial relations (transition), which were
experienced in the other companies immediately after privatisation. This phase seems
to be longer for P(S)-Lm3, probably because of more difficult problems with the sheer
survival of the company.10
The IR system in P(S)-L companies may be considered as being in the institution-
alised collective bargaining stage:
(a) collective bargaining at company level is the main mechanism for establishing the
terms and conditions of employment;
(b) there is a market and a social orientation, and the intervention of the state is re-
duced;
(c) the power of capital is higher than that of labour; and
(d) relations between capital and labour are broadly either adversarial or co-operative.
Nevertheless, three of the companies are in a development phase while one is in a
state of transition.
5.4 New small and medium-sized private companies created after 1989 – P-SME
Of the four organisations sampled, one is from the manufacturing/production sector
(printing) and three are from the service sector, all of them having operated for more
than five years. There are two small organisations, P-SEs1 and P-SEs2, in the service
sector; and two medium-sized organisations, one in the service sector, P-MEs1, and
one in manufacturing/production sector, P-MEm1, having around 100 employees.
None of them has a trade union and there is no collective bargaining at the company
level. Generally, the employer in all four companies unilaterally establishes terms and
conditions of employment, the only exception being for some core employees who
may have an individually-bargained contract.
The relations between employers and employees do not seem to differ much from
one company to another. In all the organisations a unitarist approach applies where
employers do not accept trade unions, collective bargaining and conflict, do not dele-
gate much power to middle management and are able to carry on virtually as they
please. According to the employers, their attitude vis-à-vis employees is: ‘If you are
not happy with the terms and conditions that I offer, you can leave.’ There seems to be
10 Many respondents mentioned that there are not enough contracts and that they have no
work.
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consultation with employees on technical matters, but this proceeds from a top-down
perspective. Recruitment of employees is carried out mainly on the strength of ‘rec-
ommendations’, and relatives and friends are often the first employed, irrespective of
their competence. The training of employees is carried out at the workplace by the
more experienced employees. Employees have to work properly in these companies,
but their salary is generally low and only for core employees is it usually higher than
in the public sector.
It appears that IR in all the P–SME companies investigated may be considered to
be in the contestation stage. This is because collective bargaining and industrial con-
flict are not accepted and so capital has considerably more power. This situation has
persisted in these companies since their establishment. The style of relations between
employers and employees may vary from co-operation to adversarial, depending on
the employer’s style of management. Therefore, even though there is a pluralistic le-
gal framework for IR, a unitarist approach still applies in the new small and medium-
sized private companies.
5.5 Private foreign-owned companies – Pf-E
There are two organisations in this sample; a large company (Pf-Lm1) from the pro-
duction sector (a brewery) and one medium-sized company (Pf-SMEs1) from the
service sector, both of them having been operating for more than five years. In Pf-
Lm1, there is a trade union and the main mechanism for establishing terms and condi-
tions of employment is collective bargaining at the company level. In Pf-SMEs1, the
employer unilaterally establishes terms and conditions. As for Pf-SMEs1, there is,
rarely, individual bargaining for some core employees. However, salaries in both
companies are generally much higher than in Romanian-owned companies.
The style of the relationship between employers and employees is co-operative or
conjunctive co-operative, depending mainly on the IR system of the native country of
the owner and, also, on the style of management of the top managers. For instance, Pf-
Lm1 has experienced two foreign owners from different countries and, since the
change of ownership, there has been more communication and co-operation between
employers and employees. Furthermore, this company has subsidiaries and, in one of
them, the relationships between managers and employees, and between employees,
are actually better than in the parent company. Within Pf-SMEs1, the employer-em-
ployee and inter-employee relationships are largely co-operative.
The main differences between foreign and Romanian-owned companies appears
to be that in foreign companies, the salaries are higher, there is more delegation of
power to middle management, the recruitment of staff is carried out more profession-
ally and there is more training provided, particularly for the middle managers.
Nevertheless, there are a series of similarities between foreign and Romanian-
owned companies. For instance, in Pf-SMEs1 and Romanian SMEs alike, there is no
trade union or collective bargaining and, hence, the IR system is at a contestation
stage while, in Pf-Lm1, there is a trade union and collective bargaining is at the stage
of institutionalised collective bargaining, similar to its Romanian counterparts. How-
ever, in both foreign-owned companies investigated, the relationships between em-
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ployees appear to be more co-operative and more stable than in their Romanian coun-
terparts and employees have more job satisfaction. Therefore, IR in the foreign-owned
companies investigated seems to be in a more mature phase than in their Romanian
counterparts, although both types are at a similar stage of development.
5.6 Multinational companies – private foreign-owned – Pf-MNC
Pf-MNCm1, from the production sector,11 and Pf-MNCs1, from the service sector,
constitute this group. Both of them began operating in the early 1990s. They both
have a particular mechanism to establish terms and conditions of employment – col-
lective bargaining at the company level; in Pf-MNCm1, the collective agreement is
concluded between the trade union and the management; while employees in Pf-
MNCs1 do not have a trade union and the collective agreement is concluded by em-
ployee representatives and management. In both companies, individual bargaining is
rare and mainly occurs over fringe benefits. Salaries in both companies are much
higher than in nationally-owned companies, while top managers have salaries more
comparable to those of the parent company than is the case for employees and, there-
fore, there is a large difference in the size of the salaries between management and
employees. Both organisations provide much training for employees at all levels, not
only for their middle managers.
Both companies have experienced a process of restructuring and reduction in em-
ployee numbers: by 2000, Pf-MNCm1 had 16% of the number of employees it had
before privatisation; while Pf-MNCs1 had 36%. Both companies have tried to help re-
dundant employees to find other jobs in similar companies. The process of restructur-
ing took place in stages and the development of employment relations has followed a
similar pattern. The relationship between employers and employees remains generally
co-operative after the completion of the restructuring.
Therefore, both MNCs have experienced a similar development of IR, allowing
them to be characterised as institutionalised collective bargaining, at the beginning of
a maturity phase which, according to the respondents, started in 1999. Terms and con-
ditions of employment are established through collective bargaining at the local level:
capital seems to have more power than labour; the relations between them are mainly
co-operative and the result of the exchange is, to an extent, positive.
6. Synthesis of the findings
6.1 Differences in industrial relations at the company level are determined by the
company context
As can be seen in the synthesis of the findings presented in Figure 2, there are various
types of IR systems operating at the company level. The differences in the industrial
relations of the companies investigated can be analysed in terms of the company con-
text identified by Dunlop (1958) which referred to ownership (‘political context’), the
11 Based in Hungary.
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size of the company (‘technical context’) and the sector to which the type of product
belongs – manufacturing or services (‘the economic context’).
a) Regarding ownership, there are important differences between IR within state-
owned companies and that within private ones. For instance, three out of the five
publicly-owned companies investigated are still at Stage 0, while none of the ten
privately-owned companies have reached that stage; one state-owned company
has an HRM type of IR; and only one has an institutionalised collective bargain-
ing type, the same as half of the private companies investigated.
Figure 2 – IR in Romanian companies in 2000
Legend:
Govt. = government
Stage 0 = a new stage which includes a series of features met during the communist period, but in
the context of a pluralist framework
S-L = large state-owned companies
S-SME = small and medium-sized state-owned companies
P(S)-L = large privatised companies – pre-1989 state-owned
P-SME = new privately-owned national small and medium-sized companies
Pf-E = private companies – foreign-owned
Pf-MNC= multinational companies – foreign-owned
Pos. = positive
Neg. = negative
a = transition phase
b = development phase
c = maturity phase
d = decline phase
* = number of companies from that category in a particular phase
** = one Hungarian company
Therefore, in over 60% of the state-owned companies investigated, the system of
IR is not settled and is still heavily influenced by the period of communism. How-
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ever, there is a great degree of variation between small and medium-sized state-
owned companies, one of them (S-SMEs3) having a more market-oriented policy
than any private company investigated. Nevertheless, there appears to have been
less change in the IR system in most of the state-owned companies than in their
privately-owned counterparts.
Examining the differences between the national and the foreign privately-owned
companies investigated, there does not seem to be major differences in the stage at
which these operate, but foreign-owned companies do appear to be in a more ma-
ture phase of evolution than their Romanian counterparts, as can be seen in Figure
2. This may be explained by most of the foreign employers having had more expe-
rience than their Romanian counterparts at dealing with employees in a market
economy. Additionally, it appears that they have to delegate more power and to
rely more on their middle managers because they are not familiar with Romanian
business customs, including the labour market.
b) Concerning the size of the companies investigated, there are important differences
between large companies and SMEs, particularly in the private sector, as Figure 2
explains. In all the large companies investigated, there is regular collective bar-
gaining at company level which is more or less effective, while in most SMEs
there is no collective representation. Moreover, in all private SMEs a unitarist ap-
proach applies, which is not the case in any large private company. Nevertheless,
the IR system in SMEs in the state sector varies greatly; one company investigated
has collective bargaining at a local level and another at the sectoral level, while the
third has been able to establish through collective bargaining only the rules of pro-
cedure.
c) Looking at the type of product of the companies researched, there do not seem to
be important differences between the manufacturing and the service sectors, as
Figure 2 indicates. The IR system in both the manufacturing and the service sec-
tors in state-owned large companies are at Stage 0, although the manufacturing
operations are in a transition period while the service company is in a develop-
ment phase. In the private sector, the IR system in both the manufacturing and the
service sectors are at similar stages and phases of development. Nevertheless,
there may be important differences between the manufacturing and service sectors
in Romanian IR which the broad investigative methodology of this study was una-
ble to reveal.
Therefore, the main environmental factors which determine differences in IR in
the companies researched are the type of ownership and the size of the company. As
the findings show, whether they belong to the manufacturing or the service sector does
not seem to have an important influence on the type of IR in the companies investi-
gated.
6.2 How changes in the Romanian industrial relations system at the company level
take place
Since 1989, most Romanian companies have been confronted with the problems of
survival and efficiency. It seems that, once they have resolve the problem of survival,
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they start to look at efficiency and also try to improve relationships between employ-
ers and employees. The findings in the companies researched have shown that the so-
lutions adopted by various companies are different. Most of the SMEs have adopted a
unitarist perspective, depending mainly on the owner or top manager, while large
companies have accepted a pluralist approach.
Considering the power relations between labour and capital, it appears that there
have been two stages in the development of IR in most of the large companies which
existed before 1989: in the first stage, labour had more power than capital, being sup-
ported externally by the government which was neo-communist and which had vested
interests in workers supporting them in elections; and, in the second stage, capital re-
gained power to make companies viable.
The first stage
The first stage had four phases which are more or less distinctive:
(a) transition
(b) development
(c) maturity
(d) decline
(a) The transition phase
The transition phase was characterised by the dismantling of the communist re-
gime, when employees had many formal rights which did not operate in practice. It
seems that, immediately after 1989, there was a short period when relations between
management and employees and their representatives improved.12 Many employees
started to work more responsibly, because they believed that a market economy sys-
tem would be introduced and that their quality of work mattered, but they soon real-
ised that nothing had changed. Furthermore, the lack of legislation and a left-wing
government created favourable conditions for labour to increase its power.
(b) The development phase
Since 1991, the labour movement has been developing, based on old and new leg-
islation which regulated trade union status, collective bargaining and dispute settle-
ment procedures. Trade unions developed mainly on the basis of the old structures.
Some new unions have emerged, but many use the assets of the old trade unions. On
the other hand, capital had virtually no previous experience with employers’ associa-
tions, the private sector developed very slowly and the state was still the main em-
ployer.
(c) The maturity phase
The maturity phase is considered to start when new IR legislation became opera-
tional and trade union officials, trained with external help from developed countries,
started to negotiate collective agreements and to be involved in the tripartite bodies at
a national level.
(d) The decline phase
12 Less than one year, according to the respondents.
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However, trade union power started soon to decline, particularly at the local level.
Trade unionists became more involved in politics at the national level than in protect-
ing workers’ interests at company level, and their legitimacy has declined – first at the
local level but, to some extent, a decline of power has also followed at the national
level. Furthermore, there have been external factors which have led to a decline in la-
bour power. Firstly, restructuring has started at the local level and many workers were
dismissed or companies closed down; unemployment exploded from virtually nil to
around 11%.13 Secondly, the new private sector has developed and they simply did not
accept trade unions. Furthermore, there has been an economic recession and an im-
portant fall in the population’s living standards.14
The second stage
Privatisation and/or the restructuring of companies determined a new stage in the
development of IR at the local level, with capital there having more power than the
trade union. It seems that, immediately after privatisation and/or restructuring (1-2
years), each of the companies investigated experienced a deterioration in the relation-
ship between top management and employees and their representatives.15 This period
of adversarial relations has been followed by some improvement.
In the case of private companies, this phenomenon might be related to the privati-
sation process starting only after the legal act has been signed. This clearly implies a
difficult period for the private owner. On many occasions, owners have had to restruc-
ture the company, entailing massive reductions in personnel, while there has been the
need to pay back the loans borrowed to buy the company, to obtain information about
it and its market, to form a new management team and to work with new partners.
Therefore, they first have to solve the problem of survival and, after that, to deal with
the issue of efficiency, which includes the establishment of good relations with their
employees. The solutions adopted by various large companies are different, as is
shown by the findings in the companies investigated, but they do follow a similar pat-
tern although the duration of each stage is dissimilar.
6.3 Similarities and differences in the opinions of employers and employees regar-
ding the transformation of industrial relations in Romania
Generally, there are not important differences between the opinions of employees and
their representatives, and those of employers and their representatives, but they do
emphasise several different aspects. The main positive changes in IR mentioned by
both employers and employees are as follows:
(a) the emergence of market economy institutions, particularly collective labour
agreements at the company level, the change in the role of trade unions and the
emergence of employers’ associations;
13 Raporturi de munca, No. 7, 2000: 5.
14 See The National Medium-Term Development Strategy of the Romanian Economy, 2000.
15 This happened in the Hungarian company as well, according to the respondents.
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(b) the mentality of people has started to change and there is more individual respon-
sibility.
In addition, employees and their representatives mentioned as a positive develop-
ment the introduction of the right to strike, while employers and managers noticed
that the decision-making process has become more decentralised, there is more power
delegated to the lower levels and more training for top and middle management.
The main negative changes in IR mentioned by both employers and employees are
as follows:
(a) laws are not respected, which situation has caused chaos and corruption
(b) legislation is often changed
(c) job insecurity
(d) increase of individualism and social atomisation
(e) lack of communication
(f) no real change in the mentality of workers (they still ‘pretend to work’) and of
managers (who maintain a ‘top-down’ relationship with employees)
(g) increased pay differences between workers, middle management and top manage-
ment.
In addition, employees and their representatives mentioned that, in many restruc-
tured companies, an employee who has remained in the company has to do the job of
between two and five employees made redundant, while many local trade unions re-
main dependent on management and the lack of managerial skills of senior managers.
Employers and managers noticed as negative developments in IR the increase in the
shadow economy, high payroll taxes, financial blockages and the confusion which has
been wrought by changes in the system of values.
The main issues concerning IR which were mentioned by both employers and em-
ployees are as follows:
(a) corruption, particularly of top managers and trade union leaders
(b) maladministration of companies and of the whole economy, which has led to re-
cession, macroeconomic instability and high inflation, which is an important con-
tributory factor in the low salaries and poor working conditions of most employ-
ees
(c) the lack of communication between managers and employees, between trade un-
ion officials and their members, and between employees
(d) the lack of a market economy culture and experience in it of all the actors involved
(e) discrimination against women with children and people over 40 years old
(f) the migration of young skilled people to developed countries
(g) external pressure from the IMF to close some of the most productive Romanian
companies (e.g. Clujana) in order to open market share in Romania for developed
countries.
In addition, employees and their representatives mentioned job insecurity as a
principal issue, while employers and managers from the private sector noticed a ten-
dency for people to become ‘workaholics’, working more than 10-12 hours per day
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(the higher the position, the greater the number of hours spent at work) and neglecting
of family and social life.
The main factors which may improve IR, as suggested by both employers and em-
ployees, are as follows:
(a) a change in the mentality of all the actors in order that they become more responsi-
ble. However, according to the respondents, this may take some time because it is
the experience of a market economy which is necessary to bring about a change in
mentality and this cannot be learned theoretically;
(b) to have clearer tasks and greater transparency and communication between em-
ployers and employees;
(c) more training for all social actors, as well as better moral education, cultivating
values such as honesty and respect for others, for the law and for the principle of
mutual assistance in order to prevent social atomisation and individualism;
(d) stable legislation.
In addition, employees and their representatives emphasised that a good manage-
ment team is necessary to assure work for their employees, while employers and man-
agers mentioned that, in order to find the right employee for a job, proper recruitment
is the main solution to improvements in IR. They also mentioned that teamwork and
better communication between managers is necessary in order to understand what
each of them is doing and that these were other factors which may help to improve IR
at the company level.
From the above, it can be concluded that the opinions of employees and their rep-
resentatives, and employers and managers and their representatives, does not differ
fundamentally. Both had noticed similar changes in the Romanian IR system, while
they also agreed on the issues which had arisen due to the transition to a market econ-
omy and suggested similar solutions to improve IR at company level. Nevertheless,
there were some different aspects emphasised by the two parties, employees being
mainly concerned with job insecurity, while employers and managers focused on the
factors which limited the competitiveness of their company, as mentioned above.
5. Conclusion
Since 1989, there has been a fundamental change in IR in Romania. This did not take
place rapidly but developed in stages. The emerging system of IR has new institutions
(e.g. trade unions, employers associations and a collective bargaining mechanism), but
the old attitudes of the actors still have an important influence on IR at the company
level, as these findings show. They are also in line with those of Vickerstaff et al
(1998: 220), which suggest that the process of enterprise transformation in eastern Eu-
rope is not straightforward and that economic and political heritage, and the enterprise-
specific legacies of the communist period, are still important. Hence, it appears that the
Romanian IR system is path-dependent, as scholars have found in other CEECs.16
16 See A. Pollert (1999); S. Vickerstaff et al (2000).
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A revision of Crouch’s exchange theory proved to be very useful in explaining the
great variety of IR practices at the company level. Differences in the type of IR are de-
termined mainly by the ownership and size of the company,17 while the behaviour of
senior managers also has an important influence on the system of IR at the company
level.18 As can be seen from Figure 2, in most publicly-owned companies IR has not
settled down and the influence of communist legacies is still important, while in most
of the privately-owned companies there have been more fundamental changes. Institu-
tionalised collective bargaining is the predominant type of IR among large compa-
nies, while most small companies have a contestation type of IR, which is the first
stage in the historical perspective mentioned by Crouch (1993).
Therefore, it may take a long time until a system of IR becomes firmly established
at the micro level in Romania and the IR actors will continue to gather experience in
the meantime. Crouch (1993) demonstrates that the institutions characteristic of la-
bour relations in western Europe have been built up over a long period of time. It ap-
pears that, in eastern Europe, this will also take time and that a degree of experience
will be necessary before a pluralistic type of IR can become established.
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